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Abstract 
The EU’s forthcoming 4th Railway Package will allow open access passenger rail services to operate within member 
states alongside government supported services. The 1993 UK Railways Act, which resulted in the privatisation of 
the rail network in Great Britain, envisaged the development of open access passenger rail services alongside 
franchised rail operations. It is therefore relevant to assess how this has operated in practice. In practice, only two 
significant open access operators – Grand Central Railway and Hull Trains – have emerged, serving niche markets 
that were ignored by the franchise operators. This paper discusses the reasons for this, including barriers to entry and 
the application of economic regulation to assess applications to operate open access services. Particular attention is 
given to the experience of Grand Central in obtaining track access rights to operate services from London to 
Sunderland and Bradford in Northern England. 
The paper sets out evidence, based on work undertaken for Grand Central, on the impacts of open access on the 
market for rail travel, indicating that the presence of competition appears to have increased passenger demand and 
revenue, while constraining growth in average fares. It also compares forecast and outturn ridership and revenue. 
Finally the paper considers potential future developments. These include the emergence of larger scale open access 
proposals, possible changes to the application of economic regulation to open access services and potential impacts 
from the re-classification of the Infrastructure Manager – Network Rail – as a state-owned company. The 
implications of the UK experience for the 4th Railway Package are discussed. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B. V. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Commission’s proposed Fourth Railway Package envisages the creation of a more competitive 
market for domestic rail passenger services across the European Union. It is envisaged that this will be created 
through a combination of “competition for the market”, where subsidy is required, and “competition in the market” 
where services are capable of operating commercially without subsidy (European Commission, 2013). There are a 
number of uncertainties about how this might operate in practice. 
Some evidence on combining these approaches is available from the United Kingdom (UK), where legislation 
has, since 1993, envisaged open access services operating alongside Public Service Obligation (PSO) supported 
services. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the UK experience, with particular reference to one operator – 
Grand Central Railway, and to consider its relevance to the proposed 4th Railway Package. 
2. The UK Legislative and Regulatory Environment 
The current legislative framework for the railway network in Great Britain was established under the Railways 
Act 1993. In essence this created the following main actors: 
x Infrastructure Manager – currently Network Rail; 
x Franchising Authority – responsible for the letting and management of contracts for PSO supported services, 
known in the UK as franchises. This role is now performed by the Department for Transport (DfT); 
x Independent Regulator – responsible for economic and safety regulation of the industry; formerly the Office 
of the Rail Regulator, now the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR); 
x Franchise holding Train Operating Companies (TOCs) responsible for providing franchised passenger rail 
services; 
x Other TOCs, including freight operators and open access passenger rail service providers. 
There are also a large number of other organisations involved, including rolling stock leasing companies, 
infrastructure maintenance and renewal contractors and consultants. However they are less relevant to this paper. 
While the precise organisations performing some of these roles have changed, the overall structure has remained 
reasonably constant. 
Under the current franchising model, competitive tenders are sought for the right to operate a specified, 
geographically based, package of services for a set period, typically 7 to 10 years. Bidders set out the year by year 
premium or subsidy they require as part of their offer.  The franchising system transfers most commercial risk to 
operators, including both revenue and cost risk. In recent years, especially during the recent recession, DfT has been 
willing to assume some revenue risk. In the financial year ending in April 2013 8 franchised TOCs made net 
payments to DfT and 10 received subsidy.  However DfT also part funds Network Rail through direct grant. 
Available information indicates that only 3 TOCs (all London suburban operators) would have made net payments if 
they bore the full costs of the infrastructure they use (DfT and ORR, 2014). It should also be noted that the risk of 
changes in track access charges is not transferred to franchise operators. Franchises are let on the basis of current 
access charges and the effect of any changes is neutralised by changing the premium/ subsidy by an equivalent 
amount. 
When the legislative framework was established, it was considered important to retain the benefits of a national 
network in a multi-operator environment, while also providing for competing services.  In particular, there is an 
obligation on all passenger rail operators to sell each others’ tickets, for a set commission, and the availability of 
anywhere to anywhere tickets throughout the network was protected. Certain key ticket types are available between 
any two stations on the network and these are valid on any relevant operator’s services, whether franchised or not. 
However operators have introduced their own, non-inter-available tickets in parallel. There is an established 
mechanism for managing the large financial flows that result from this system. This approach has both maintained 
the benefits, from a user perspective, of a national network and reduced barriers to entry by giving new operators 
access to a nationwide retailing network. 
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3. Development of Competition 
While the Railways Act envisaged on track competition, it was considered that some protection against it was 
needed during the initial phase of privatisation. It was thought that the risk of competition would discourage 
companies from bidding for franchises, given the risks inherent in taking over businesses with a limited trading 
record and transferring them into the private sector. Accordingly, for the first few years after privatisation, 
competition was banned for key flows on each operator’s network. 
This limited the scope for competition, although it developed between franchise operators where their services 
overlapped. There were also a small number of instances where franchise operators sought to extend services 
beyond their franchise area. In addition, a few specialised services developed, of which the most important is the 
Heathrow Express shuttle service to London’s main airport, operated by the owner of the airport.  
The first example of a true competing open access intercity service was Hull Trains, which started operation in 
September 2000. This service was able to operate by identifying a main flow (between the city of Hull and London) 
and some subsidiary flows that were not subject to protection. This service has developed from three trains/ day in 
each direction initially to seven trains/ day on weekdays (five at weekends) today. 
In 2004 the then Rail Regulator, Tom Winsor, completed a review of restrictions on on-track competition. While 
recognising his duty “to exercise his functions....in the manner which he considers best calculated ‘to promote 
competition in the provision of railway services for the benefit of users of railway services’”, he stated that he 
“acknowledges that there are competing services that are primarily abstractive of incumbents’ revenue without 
compensating economic benefits – cherry-picking services – are undesirable” (Office of the Rail Regulator, 2004). 
The Regulator then set out a series of duties that he needed to balance including: 
x Promoting competition; 
x Maximising the use of the railway; 
x Allowing operators to plan their businesses with a reasonable degree of certainty; and 
x Having regard to the financial impact on government. 
He then went on to set out a series of tests that potential operators of competing services would need to pass. In 
essence, applicants need to demonstrate: 
x The proposed service will be financially viable, so that the operator will continue to run it and the allocated 
train paths will be utilised. 
x The new service is not “primarily abstractive” from existing services, that is it will attract new business to rail 
rather than simply taking existing customers from other operators (the “Not Primarily Abstractive Test”). 
x Track capacity is available to allow the proposed service to operate. 
Subsequently, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) added an additional criterion that, if more than one operator is 
seeking to utilise the same capacity, rights should be granted for the proposal which creates the greatest economic 
benefits. 
In practice, ORR has considered services where the ratio of generated to abstracted revenue is greater than 0.3:1 
as being not primarily abstractive. This may not appear to be a demanding threshold, but demonstrating that services 
exceed it, using evidence acceptable to ORR, has been challenging on occasions. 
In order to assess open access applications, ORR has developed a methodology based on the use of industry 
standard forecasting tools. In essence this involves using the industry standard MOIRA package, plus a series of 
overlays to represent impacts that MOIRA does not adequately represent. MOIRA is designed to forecast the impact 
of incremental service changes and does not take account of differential fares by competing operators. It is based on 
station to station journeys and revenue, so cannot predict switching between stations as a result of new services (for 
example passengers switching from a main line rail head to a more local station which gains a through service to 
their destination). The overlays are designed to represent: 
x Transformational changes in service levels (early evidence from Hull Trains showed that the standard MOIRA 
elasticities to generalised journey time under-estimate the impact of these changes); 
x Station choice; and 
x Price competition. 
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For the purposes of the Not Primarily Abstractive Test, ORR assume that all passengers who switch from other 
services due to a better service, a service from a more local station or cheaper fares are abstracted. Passengers who 
are new to rail are generated. The performance of this modelling framework, when applied to Grand Central 
services, is discussed below. There is a concern by open access operators that ORR has not given adequate weight to 
the benefits of station switching or lower fares when assessing applications. Station switching leads to shorter access 
journeys and potential transfer to more sustainable modes, with consequent reductions in road traffic flows and 
emissions. As shown below, price competition has resulted in lower fares on the incumbent operator’s services with 
benefits to all consumers. 
4.  Grand Central’s Track Access Applications  
Against this background, a new operator, Grand Central Railway, submitted applications in September 2005 to 
introduce new services from London to the cities of Sunderland and Bradford. The application was for four services 
per day in each direction on each route. This was supported by detailed business cases, including revenue 
projections and estimates of generated and abstracted revenue prepared by AECOM. These business cases were 
developed prior to ORR developing its own methodology. The routes are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 Fig. 1: Initial Grand Central Route Proposals 
 
The Application was strongly opposed by the incumbent franchise operator, Great North Eastern Railway 
(GNER) and DfT on the grounds that: 
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x The service would mainly abstract from existing services and would generate little new revenue; 
x It would de-stabilise the East Coast franchise and reduce the premium paid to DfT when it was re-tendered; 
x Insufficient capacity existed to operate the service without a negative impact on the reliability of other services;  
x Grand Central would have an unfair advantage because it would pay lower track access charges. 
 
The latter was suggested because franchised passenger operators pay fixed charges for access to the routes over 
which they operate as well as usage related variable access charges. Non-franchised operators, open access 
passenger and freight, only pay the variable charge (there are also other charges relating to the use of scarce capacity 
and, where relevant, use of traction power supplies, which are paid by all operators.) However, as noted above, 
franchised operators are protected against changes in access charges.  
Following a public hearing in March 2006, track access rights were granted for three daily services in each 
direction between Sunderland and London, with the remaining services not approved due to concerns about 
available track capacity. GNER took legal action against ORR to overturn this decision but this was rejected by the 
courts. Grand Central started operation in December 2007. Subsequently, additional services have been approved, as 
shown in Table 1 and the company now operates 5 services to Sunderland and 4 to Bradford on weekdays. 
Table 1. Development of Grand Central Services 
Date Service Introduced 
December 2007 3 trains daily Sunderland - London 
May 2010 3 trains daily Bradford – London 
4th Sunderland – London service, Monday to Saturday 
December 2011 4th Sunday Sunderland – London service 
December 2012 5th Sunderland – London service, Monday to Saturday 
December 2013 4th daily Bradford – London train 
5.  Impacts of Grand Central on the Rail Travel Market 
In 2012 AECOM undertook a detailed review of Grand Central ridership and revenue, together with its impacts 
on the rail market on the East Coast corridor and we have subsequently had access to summary revenue data. The 
results of this work are summarised below, although commercial confidentiality means that detailed revenue results 
cannot be quoted. 
5.1. Outturn versus Forecast Revenue 
The 2012 review, based on data for the financial year ending April 2012, showed that overall revenue on the 
Sunderland route was slightly higher than had been forecast in 2005, despite the fact that the 4th daily service had 
been operating for less than two years. Subsequently continued strong revenue growth has been experienced, partly 
due to the introduction of the 5th weekday service. Comparison with results using an approach based on the ORR 
methodology indicated that total revenue was about 12% lower than their modelling framework indicated. However, 
growth in 2012/13, before the fifth service would have made a significant impact, was sufficient to bring forecast 
and outturn revenues broadly into line. 
In the case of the Bradford service, the methodology used in the business case (adjusted to allow for three rather 
than four services daily) and the ORR approach produced similar revenue forecasts. In 2012, actual revenues were 
significantly lower. Reasons for this include journey times approximately 15 minutes longer than projected in 2005, 
poor reliability when the service started operation in 2010, resulting in slow initial revenue growth, and the lack of a 
northbound service from London during the peak period in the afternoon. However, revenue has grown by more 
than 50% in the past two years and is now much closer to the forecast level. 
More detailed analysis of the 2012 outturn revenue shows:  
x 40% from trips between London and stations with no London service before Grand Central started operations; 
x 49% from trips between London and stations with an existing service, and 
x 11% from other flows. 
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Comparing these results with forecast revenues shows: 
x The ORR methodology very substantially understates the revenue from stations that get a new through service 
to London. Across the two routes forecast 2011/12 revenue was only 33% of the outturn for these flows in 
aggregate. The business plan forecast was 95% of the outturn in aggregate, albeit with significant pluses and 
minuses at individual stations; 
x Conversely the ORR approach overstates revenue potential for stations with an existing London service, 
forecasting 64% more revenue than the outturn. The business plan forecast was 11% lower than the outturn. 
x Both forecasts seriously over-estimate revenue for non-London flows with outturn revenue less than 50% of 
either forecast. 
Through services to London from stations with no previous service are likely to generate a higher percentage of 
new rail passengers than stations with an existing service or non-London flows. This is supported by results using 
both forecasting approaches. As a consequence, it appears that the ORR approach seriously under-estimates the 
overall level of generation and over-states the level of abstraction, with significant consequences for the Not 
Primarily Abstractive Test. 
5.2. Impacts on the Travel Market  
In order to analyse the wider impacts on the rail travel market between London and stations on the East Coast 
route, we examined growth in rail trips, revenue and yield for the main stations on the route, distinguishing between 
those experiencing competition and those where services are provided by a single operator. Table 2 sets out the 
stations considered. 
Table 2. Categorization of East Coast Stations 
Category Stations 
With Competition Peterborough, Grantham, Retford, Doncaster, Wakefield, 
York, Northallerton 
No Competition Newark, Leeds, Darlington, Durham, Newcastle, 
Berwick, Edinburgh 
 
There is competition between East Coast and another franchised operator, First Capital Connect, between 
Peterborough and London. Elsewhere East Coast is competing with Hull Trains or Grand Central. 
Results of the analysis are shown in Table 3. These results are not weighted by revenue at each station as the 
objective was to assess the impact of the presence or absence of competition. 
Table 3. Index of Change in Journeys, Revenue and Yield for Stations with and without Competition, 2007 to 2012 
  Journeys Revenue Yield 
Average – all sample stations 1.35 1.53 1.14 
Average – all stations affected by competition 1.42 1.57 1.11 
Average – all stations unaffected  by competition 1.27 1.48 1.17 
 
The impact at individual stations with and without competition is shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. This is 
based on AECOM analysis of LENNON data. Change from 2007 is shown as an index and the average for the 14 
ECML stations sampled is shown as a dotted red line.  
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Fig. 2: Results for Stations Affected by Competition (Indices for 2007 to 2012) 
 
Fig. 3: Results for Stations Not Affected by Competition (Indices for 2007 to 2012) 
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The most remarkable finding is the strong growth that has been achieved for the route as a whole during the UK’s 
worst recession for more than 70 years. The table also shows that passenger journeys for stations affected by 
competition have increased by 42% compared with 27% for those without competition. Revenue has also increased 
at a faster rate (57% compared to 48%) where competition occurs, but the increase in yields has been lower. This 
supports the hypothesis that competition is likely to result in higher demand and lower fares than would occur 
without it. Clearly local economic and demographic factors will have affected results for particular stations but these 
are unlikely to explain the overall difference. 
However it could be argued that Darlington has been indirectly affected by competition from Grand Central, as 
some passengers could have switched to the Sunderland service, although only part of the catchment area would 
have been affected. Removing Darlington, results in ridership growth of 31% and revenue growth of 53% for the 
remaining stations without competition, with yield growing by 17%. Again, this shows that ridership and revenue 
growth has been higher for stations with competition and yield has increased more slowly. 
5.3. Impact on the Incumbent Operator 
In order to assess the impacts of competition on the incumbent operator, further analysis was undertaken for two 
stations – Northallerton and York – where competition started in December 2007. 
At York, between 2008 and 2012, passenger journeys using East Coast services have increased by 12% compared 
with an average of 22% for all East Coast stations. In contrast, Grand Central has achieved nearly a four-fold 
increase in journeys during this period (albeit from a very low base), resulting in a 26% increase in London trips for 
both operators. The yields for both operators have reduced in absolute terms between 2008 and 2012 when 
compared in 2012 prices. Both indicators show competition has boosted passenger journeys and reduced average 
yields. Despite Grand Central competition, East Coast revenue has increased since 2008 ahead of inflation, albeit by 
only 4%. 
 
The trends for Northallerton are broadly similar to the results from York. Passengers using East Coast from this 
station have increased by just 4% between 2008 and 2012, although timetable improvements in May 2011 generated 
a significant increase in 2012. Prior to 2012, there is evidence that a number of passengers had diverted from East 
Coast to Grand Central given the respective growth rates. In 2012, the number of passengers using both operators 
increased compared with 2011. Total East Coast revenue rose by 1% ahead of inflation between 2008 and 2012. 
East Coast revenue yield dropped slightly, by 3% in 2012 prices. The Grand Central yield for Northallerton has 
reduced between 2008 and 2012.  
Grand Central yields have gradually reduced relative to East Coast since 2008, but are broadly comparable. This 
suggests healthy competition. The comparison of results for York and Northallerton indicates the growth rates using 
East Coast services from these stations is lower than the overall average for the route. The significant increase in 
passenger journeys using Grand Central both at York and Northallerton suggests it has attracted a number of trips 
from East Coast, but not sufficient to prevent East Coast from continuing to grow relatively slowly. 
5.4. Conclusions 
The principal conclusions from the travel market analysis are: 
x Given the inherent uncertainties in the forecasting process for new rail services and some specific issues on the 
Bradford route, the revenue forecasts in the original business plan have proved to be reasonably robust. 
x The ORR methodology significantly under-predicts revenue for flows that obtain a new through service to 
London and over-predicts for stations with an existing service to London and for non-London flows. This 
appears to result in an under-estimate of the proportion of revenue that is generated. 
x Rail travel on the East Coast (and other inter-city corridors) has been remarkably resilient in the face of the 
worst recession that the UK has experienced for more than 70 years. 
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x On average, stations where there is competition saw faster growth in ridership (42% compared to 27%) and 
revenue (57% compared to 47%) but slower growth in yield (11% compared to 17%) relative to those where 
there is no competition. This is in line with the expected effects of competition. 
x While the results for individual stations have been affected by a range of economic and demographic factors 
there is no reason to believe that that they have lead to this overall result.  
x At both Northallerton and York, the levels of competition experienced have not resulted in a decline in East 
Coast ridership and real revenue. At both stations, these grew between 2008 and 2012, albeit at lower rates than 
for the route as a whole. Revenue yields for both operators declined over the period in real terms, indicating 
healthy competition. 
6. Future Developments 
Grand Central’s sister company, Alliance Rail, has developed proposals for three new open access services as 
shown in Figure 4: 
x London to Leeds(via Manchester) and Blackpool via the West Coast route; 
x London to Leeds, Bradford and Cleethorpes via the East Coast route; and 
x London to Edinburgh via Newcastle. 
 
Fig. 4: Proposed Alliance Rail Services 
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The first two proposals are similar in concept to the existing Grand Central services in that they involve operating 
services that diverge from the main intercity corridors to serve niche markets that have been ignored by the franchise 
operators. However they differ from the existing services in three main ways: 
x Higher frequency, in that the services are between hourly and two hourly throughout the day arriving and 
leaving London; 
x Serving major centres (Manchester and Leeds respectively) which have not benefitted from competition up to 
now; and 
x The use of new trains, bringing higher quality and scope to tailor the specification to the needs of the route. 
 
Business cases have been prepared for these services, which show strong revenue potential and generation: 
abstraction ratios which meet ORR’s benchmark. The West Coast route proposal is awaiting final regulatory 
approval. The Bradford/ Cleethorpes proposal is on hold while the Edinburgh service is taken forward. 
The latter is seen as an opportunity to run a very hourly fast service, using new tilting trains, between Edinburgh 
and London with a stop at Newcastle only. At present, journey times on the route are at the cusp of achieving 
substantial transfer from air and it is considered that the proposed service will make substantial inroads into air’s 
market share, thereby meeting ORR’s requirements, creating significant industry benefits and encouraging a shift to 
more sustainable transport modes. It will also provide a competing service to two more major cities. 
7. Overall Conclusions and Lessons for the Fourth Railway Package 
The first conclusion is that Grand Central has been successful and is making a valuable contribution to meeting 
travel needs in the corridors it serves. In particular, it has provided new through services to stations ignored by the 
franchise operator, has led to increased frequency at a number of stations and has resulted in lower fares to 
consumers. By providing services to stations closer to travellers’ homes, it has reduced the need to railhead to more 
distant interchanges. The view that Grand Central would attract little new business to rail has proved to be false. 
Interestingly, despite competition, East Coast paid a £190.5 million premium to DfT for 2012/13 (DfT and ORR, 
2014), more than any other operator. Clearly some revenue has been abstracted by Grand Central, but competition 
should have resulted in improved marketing and customer service with positive revenue impacts. The precise net 
impact on the premium is uncertain, but there is no evidence that competition has had a serious negative effect. This 
supports the Commission’s view that competition leads to benefits on major intercity corridors. 
The application of the Not Primarily Abstractive Test has, so far, served to restrict competition to routes where a 
significant proportion of revenue can be derived from niche markets that have been ignored by the franchised 
operators. In particular, the effects of competition in improving the offer from the incumbent operator through lower 
fares and improved service quality does not seem to have been recognised by ORR. 
Although the majority of Grand Central’s revenue is derived from dedicated tickets valid only on its services, the 
continued existence of inter-available tickets that can be used on any operator’s services was important at the start of 
operation and provides important network benefits to consumers, who do not need to book multiple tickets for 
journeys that involve using more than one operator’s services. The requirement on all operators to sell each other’s 
tickets, in return for a commission, has given open access operators access to a nationwide retailing network. While 
the rapid growth in internet sales has reduced the importance of this, lack of retail outlets could have been a barrier 
to entry, except for very large new entrants. 
The UK model of having PSO supported services covering the whole network, but making provision for open 
access creates some particular regulatory challenges. It has created a situation where, in assessing open access 
Applications, ORR is required to consider their duty to “enable persons providing railway services to plan their 
future of their businesses with a reasonable degree of assurance” (Railways Act, 1993). It is also required to 
consider the impact on the financial position of government, as a funder of the industry. While the Grand Central 
experience shows that these impacts have been limited and much less than claimed by the incumbent operator and 
the Department for Transport, this is a fertile ground for argument. ORR’s position has, in essence, allowed open 
access where it serves niche markets ignored by the franchise operator, but not head to head competition between 
London and the main regional centres. Alliance Rail’s current proposals for services which stop at Manchester and 
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Leeds are testing the limits of the “niche market” approach. The Edinburgh proposal would create true head to head 
competition, although in specific circumstances where air is currently the dominant mode.  The Commission’s 
proposals are likely to create similar regulatory challenges in other countries given that they allow for “the 
possibility to limit access where the economic equilibrium of a PSC [Public Service Contract] is compromised” 
(European Commission, 2013). Incumbent operators and DfT have argued against Grand Central’s and Alliance’s 
proposals on precisely these grounds. 
The European Commission’s approach appears to assume that there are easily separable commercial and PSO-
supported networks. These may be difficult to define in reality. Although some UK intercity operators pay 
premiums to government, they may be required as part of their franchise agreements to cross-subsidise unprofitable 
activities (for example serving certain stations or providing trains at particular times of day) that they would not 
otherwise undertake. These activities are considered socially desirable and there is operational logic in having them 
undertaken by the main operator on the route. There may also be operational logic in having a single operator 
responsible for a (profitable) main line and (unprofitable) feeder routes. Even if it were possible to separate out a 
“commercial” network, governments may find opportunities not to do so if they do not support the Commission’s 
approach.  
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